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In a recent Supreme Court decision, a statute whichprohibited corporate activity
in initiatives and referendums not material, affecting the corporation was struck
down as a violation of the first amendment. Despite the perceived need to protect
against the effect of the power of the aggregate economic wealth of corporations in
other contexts, the Courtfelt that such power had not had a demonstrable effect on
votingpatterns. Thispaper examines the impact of this decision. The authors argue
that the effect of corporate campaign activiy can be demonstrated and may be suffi-
cient to romptfurther legislative activity to minimize the effect of corporate wealth
in this area or to overrule the Court's decisiota
INTRODUCTION
ON APRIL 26, 1978, the United States Supreme Court in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti upheld the right of a cor-
poration to make political expenditures from general corporate
funds in connection with a state referendum.2 The Court ruled
unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute which prohibited speci-
fied banks and business corporations from making contributions
or expenditures "for the purpose of. . . influencing or affecting
the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other than one
* B.A. (1958), Bethany College (Bethany, Oklahoma); J.D. (1964), Yale University.
The author is currently serving as the senior United States Senator from the state of Colo-
rado. Before coming to the Senate, he held positions in the United States Department of
Justice, the Department of the Interior, and on the faculty of the University of Colorado
School of Law. He also served as National Campaign Director for George McGovern
during the 1972 Presidential election.
** B.A. (1977) University of Pennsylvania; J.D. candidate, George Washington Uni-
versity.
1. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
2. Id. The Court split 5-4. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens. Chief Justice Burger also joined the majority
opinion but wrote separately "to raise some questions likely to arise in this area in the
future." Id. at 795. Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in a dissenting opinion by Jus-
tice White. A separate dissent was filed by Justice Rehnquist.
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materially affecting any of the property, business, or assets of the
corporation. ' 3 The Court found that "there was no showing that
the relative voice of corporations has been overwhelming or even
significant in influencing referenda in Massachusetts."4
The Supreme Court's decision raises the possibility that not
only corporations, but also such entities as labor unions, partner-
ships, associations, and political action committees will become
even more financially involved in electoral politics. The Court's
decision is particularly significant because more states are putting
controversial issues before the voters.' Such ballot questions re-
late, for example, to nuclear power plant construction, nonreturn-
able bottles, and utility ratemaking rules.' In many cases it can be
argued that extensive corporate and industry advertising cam-
paigns may directly affect the outcome of the balloting.'
The electoral process is, of course, the very heart of our demo-
cratic system. The first amendment strives to make the necessary
exchange of views vigorous. When political advertising by large
corporations for the purpose of influencing state and local referen-
3. MASs. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 55 § 8 (West Supp. 1979) provides:
No corporation carrying on the business of a bank, trust, surety, indemnity, safe
deposit, insurance, railroad, street railway, telegraph, telephone, gas, electric light,
heat, power, canal, aqueduct, or water company, no company having the right to
take land by eminent domain or to exercise franchises in public ways, granted by
the commonwealth or by any county, city or town, no trustee or trustees owning
or holding the majority of the stock of such a corporation, no business corpora-
tion incorporated under the laws of or doing business in the commonwealth and
no officer or agent acting in behalf of any corporation mentioned in this section,
shall directly or indirectly give, pay, expend or contribute, or promise to give, pay,
expend or contribute, any money or other valuable thing for the purpose of aid-
ing, promoting or preventing the nomination or election of any person to public
office, or aiding, promoting or antagonizing the interests of any political party, or
influencing or affecting the vote on any question submitted to the voters, other
than one materially affecting any of the property, business or assets of the corpo-
ration. No question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the
income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially to af-
fect the property, business or assets of the corporation. No person or persons, no
political committee, and no person acting under the authority of a political com-
mittee, or in its behalf, shall solicit or receive from such corporation or such hold-
ers of stock any gift, payment, expenditure, contribution or promise to give, pay,
expend or contribute for any such purpose.
Any corporation violating any provision of this section shall be punished by a
fine of not more than fifty thousand dollars and any officer, director or agent of
the corporation violating any provision thereof or authorizing such violation, ...
shall be punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or by imprison-
ment for not more than one year, or both.
4. 435 U.S. at 789.
5. See, ag., NEwswEEK, Nov. 20, 1978, at 53.
6. See, eg., id.; Herbers, Deciding by Referendum Is a Popular Proposition, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 12, 1978 § 4, at 4, col. 3.
7. See notes 61-85 infra and accompanying text,
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dums almost totally dominates the marketplace of ideas, such ex-
penditures may seriously threaten that exchange.'
This paper begins with a discussion of the Betlotti case and the
new constitutional principles it represents.9 The paper then exam-
ines the case in the light of longstanding governmental interest in
and regulation of corporation influence on the electoral process, '0
an interest prompted by the well-recognized need to guard against
corporate domination of the political process." The focus then
shifts to the implications of Belloi on the increasing use of refer-
endums and initiatives on the state and local level.' Finally, it
examines the various legislative alternatives available to actively
preserve and protect the integrity of our political structure. 13
I. THE BELLO=[I DECISION
The Massachusetts statute in Belloti prohibited corporations
from making contributions or expenditures for political advertis-
ing in referendums and initiatives involving questions not materi-
ally affecting the assets of the corporation. 4 The statute further
specified that "no question submitted to the voters solely concern-
ing the taxation of the income, property or transactions of individ-
uals shall be deemed materially to affect the property, business, or
assets of the corporation."'"
The specific controversy in Bellotti involved a proposed state
constitutional amendment placed before the Massachusetts voters
in the 1976 general election, which would have permitted the leg-
islature to impose a graduated tax on individual incomes.'6 Sev-
8. For a discussion of the theoretical invidiousness of corporate influence over the
electorate through a corporation's vast accumulation of wealth and its privileged status
(which in other contexts has led states to regulate corporate activities), see Justice White's
dissenting opinion. 435 U.S. at 802, 809 (White, J., dissenting).
9. See notes 14-38 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 39-60 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 61-85 infra and accompanying text.
12. See notes 86-90 infra and accompanying text.
13. See notes 91-126 infra and accompanying text.
14. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55 § 8 (West Supp. 1979). For text of this section, see
note 3 supra.
15. Id.
16. 435 U.S. at 769. The amendment provided:
Article of Amendment. Art. -. As an alternative to levying a tax on income in
the manner provided in Article XLIV of the Amendments to the Constitution, the
General Court shall have full power and authority to levy a tax on personal in-
comes at rates which are graduated according to the total amount of income re-
ceived, regardless of the sources from which it may be derived, and to grant
reasonable exemptions, deductions, credits and abatements to such tax. Further,
the General Court may define the tax liability or the total income upon which
[Vol. 29:808
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eral banking associations and business corporations expressed a
desire to spend money to publicize their views on the proposed
amendment. 7 The Attorney General of Massachusetts informed
them that he would enforce the prohibition against them should
they attempt any such expenditures."8 Consequently, they
brought an action seeking to have the statute containing the prohi-
bition declared unconstitutional.' 9 The Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts upheld the constitutionality of the statute, issu-
ing its opinion after the vote on the referendum.20
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
case had not been rendered moot,2' and that the statute was un-
such tax is levied or the graduated rates at which it is taxed by reference to any
provision of the laws of the United States as the same may be or become effective
at any time or from time to time and may prescribe reasonable exceptions to and
modifications of such provision.
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773,774 n.3, 359 N.E.2d 1262, 1265
n.3 (1977).
17. The appellants were the First National Bank of Boston, New England Merchants
National Bank, Gillette Co., Digital Equipment Corp., and Wyman-Gordon Co., 435 U.S.
at 768 n.l.
18. Id. at 769.
19. Id. The action was brought before the vote on the amendment. An order denying
declaratory judgment was issued after a decision by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court on September 22, 1976. Two earlier actions had been brought protesting similar
prohibitions against corporate spending on referendums and initiatives. First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 352 Mass. 570, 290 N.E.2d 526 (1972) (ruling by two of five
justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court that a statute similar to the one in
Bel/oul was unconstitutional); Lustwerk v. Lytron, Inc., 344 Mass. 647, 183 N.E.2d 871
(1962) (allowing corporations to participate in a campaign regarding a graduated income
tax on corporations and individuals).
20. First Nat'1 Bank of Boston v. Attorney Gen., 371 Mass. 773, 359 N.E.2d 1262
(1977). The plaintiffs made several arguments regarding the unconstitutionality of the stat-
ute: I) that it deprived them of first amendment rights, id. at 781, 359 N.E.2d at 1268; 2)
that it was too vague and also overbroad, id.; 3) that it was a denial of equal protection, id.
at 793, 359 N.E.2d at 1275; and 4) that the provision prohibiting corporate spending on any
vote or a graduated personal income tax was an improper irrebuttable presumption in a
criminal case, id. at 794, 359 N.E.2d at 1275. On the first amendment claims, the Massa-
chusetts court held that since corporations were not persons they did not have the same
rights of free speech as natural persons but rather had rights to protect corporate property
through the fourteenth amendment. By limiting corporate electoral participation to mat-
ters materially affecting the assets of the corporation the statute met those fourteenth
amendment requirements. Id. at 784-85, 359 N.E.2d at 1270.
21. 435 U.S. at 774-75. Because the 1976 referendum in question had been held, and
the proposed constitutional amendment defeated, it was necessary for the Court to confront
the issue.of mootness. Citing Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515
(1911), the Court held that the facts of the case brought it within the mootness exception for
cases "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 435 U.S. at 774. There are two elements
to this exception: "'(1) mhe challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully
litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that
the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.'" Id. at 774.
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CA4SE WESTERN RESERVE LdW REVIEW
constitutional on first amendment grounds.22
The Supreme Court explained that the state court had not ad-
dressed the proper constitutional issue. The true issue was not
whether corporations have first amendment fights and whether
those fights are coextensive with those of natural persons,' but
rather, whether the statute in issue abridged expression protected
by the first amendment.24 The Court said that the nature or iden-
tity of the speaker was of little consequence so long as the speech
was protected:
If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would sug-
gest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the
type of speech indispensible to decision-making in a democ-
racy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a
corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of
the speech, in terms of its capacity for informing the public
does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corpo-
ration, association, union, or individual.25
Bellotti is significant with regard to several constitutional prin-
ciples. First, it reaffirms the Supreme Court's view that the Con-
stitution protects the right to listen as well as the right to speak.26
(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1974)). The first element was met be-
cause the time between announcement of the referendum and the election was too short to
allow the Court to hear the matter. Id. The second element was satisfied because fre-
quency with which the graduated income tax issue had been before the voters (four times)
virtually assured that it would again be on the ballot. Id. at 775.
One commentator has noted that Belloti may be significant because the Court easily
could have avoided deciding the issue by finding the case moot, as it did with cases under
the Federal Corrupt Practice Act. Fox, Corporate Political Speech: The Effect ofFirst Na-
tional Bank of Boston v. Bellotti Upon Statutory Limitations on Corporate Referendum
Spending, 67 Ky. L.J. 75, 86 (1978-1979).
22. For a discussion of the Court's reasoning, see notes 24-35 infra and accompanying
text.
23. See note 20 supra.
24. 435 U.S. at 776.
25. Id. at 777. Quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), the Court stated,
"there is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment
was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." 435 U.S. at 776-77. Whether a
state should enact a graduated personal income tax is exactly that type discussion. The
Court then addressed the question "whether the corporate identity of the speaker deprives
the proposed speech of what otherwise would be its clear entitlement to protection." Id. at
778. Rejecting the reasoning of the Massachusetts court, the Court stated that free speech
had always been part of the liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment and
that corporations had been included in that protection. Id. at 779-80. Therefore, a corpo-
ration's fourteenth amendment rights went beyond protection of property, and the state's
limitation of political advertising to only those issues that materially affected corporate
property.was unconstitutional. 435 U.S. at 784.
26. In refuting the respondent's contention that the materially affecting rationale
found full support in Supreme Court cases involving the regulation of the speech rights of
media entertainment corporations, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 375 U.S. 367
[Vol. 29:808
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Second, it may reflect the Court's view that the purposes of the
first amendment are better served by allowing uninhibited access
to communication media.27 Further, the Court's decision may
also be important in providing commercial speech with increased
first amendment protection.2"
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell noted that the consti-
tutionality of the Massachusetts statute turned on whether the
statute could survive "the exacting scrutiny necessitated by a state-
imposed restriction on freedom of speech."29 Under this test, "the
state may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
which is compelling. '30  Massachusetts advanced two such inter-
ests. First, the State asserted an interest in keeping individual citi-
zens active in the electoral process and thereby preventing the
deterioration of their confidence in that process.31 Second, it as-
serted interest in protecting the rights of shareholders who dissent
from the views expressed by management on behalf of the corpo-
ration.32 The majority held that neither of these interests was ac-
tually served by the ban on corporate political advertising for
referendums.33
The weakest aspect of the majority opinion, and the one on
which this paper shall focus, is that part of the discussion which
attempts to refute the State's contention that corporate participa-
(1969) (which upheld the fairness doctrine in the face of an attack on it on first amendment
grounds), the Court noted that such cases were based "not only on the role of the First
Amendment in fostering individual self-expression, but also in its role in affording the
public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas." 435
U.S. at 783. See also Fox, supra note 21.
27. Fox, supra note 21, at 75.
28. 435 U.S. at 783. See also Fox, supra note 21, at 75-76.
29. 435 U.S. at 786.
30. Id. (quoting Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960)).
31. Id. at 787.
32. Id See also id. at 802, 805-06 (White, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 788-95. The majority did not reject the second interest outright but found
that the statute was both overinclusive and underinclusive in its attempt to serve that inter-
est. It was overinclusive because it banned corporate political activity even when there was
unanimous shareholder approval and underinclusive because the statute allowed corporate
financing of legislative lobbying notwithstanding shareholder desires. Id. at 792-95. Jus-
tice White challenged the majority's reasoning and focused the heart of his dissent on the
assertion that those interests were compelling enough to subordinate first amendment pro-
tections:
What is inexplicable, is for the Court to substitute its judgment as to the proper
balance for that of Massachusetts where the state has passed legislation reason-
ably designed to further First Amendment interests in the context of the political
arena where the expertise of legislators is at its peak and that of judges is at its
very lowest.
Id. at 804.
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tion in the discussion of a referendum issue may unduly influence
the vote on the issue and result in the destruction of confidence in
the democratic process and the integrity of government. Justice
Powell declined to recognize a compelling state interest in
preventing such undue influence, explaining that "there has been
no showing that the relative voice of corporations has been over-
whelming or even significant in influencing referenda in Massa-
chusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the
citizenry in the government."3
Notably, Justice Powell left the door open for the decision to
be narrowed.in the future. He explained that if the Massachusetts
Attorney General's arguments "were supported by record or legis-
lative findings that corporate advocacy threatened imminently to
undermine democratic processes, thereby denigrating rather than
serving First Amendment interests, these arguments would merit
our consideration." 5 Yet, recent legislative findings regarding the
influence of corporate political advocacy36 and other initial stud-
ies37 indicate that the relative voice of corporations may be over-
whelming and thus may be very significant in influencing state
and local referendums. This important information is almost cer-
tain to come before the Court in future cases regarding corporate
political activity. Thus, any conclusions to the effect that Bellotti
will make it difficult to impose restrictions on corporate referen-
dum spending may be premature and shortsighted.38
II. THE GOVERNMENTAL INTEREST IN REGULATING
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY
Corporate electoral involvement poses important questions of
34. Id. at 789-90 (footnotes omitted).
35. Id. at 789.
36. See notes 69-85 infra and accompanying text.
37. Id.
38. But see Fox, supra note 21. After discussing the dismissal of the state's claim of
interest in seeing its election process avoid any undue influence inherent in corporate cam-
paign activity, the author states, "Such an emphatic rejection of this 'undue influence' pur-
pose [by Bellolti] makes it appear expressly unlikelythat a particular record or legislative
recitation of spending history would be significantly egregious to warrant the imposition of
any limitation on corporate spending." Id. at 94. He concludes:
The Court in Belloti affirmed that that unreasonable burdens could not be placed
in the way of prospective corporate speech on political and economic matters. It
will be difficult to draft a state statute whose burden will be held to be a reason-
able one. It seems likely that the Belloti case will preclude any statutory restric-
tions which will impose substantial and discriminatory burdens upon corporate
expression of opinion concerning referendum questions.
Id. at 101.
[Vol 29:808
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abiding concern for American political theory and practice. First,
one must examine the very legitimacy of collective political action
by concentrated economic interests. Not enough is known about
the effects of such action on the quality and effectiveness of politi-
cal participation by the unorganized individual citizen in the
American political process.39 One must ask whether large eco-
nomic interests could combine aggregated wealth with massive or-
ganizational resources to dominate the selection of public officials
and influence the formulation of public policy to the extent that
the integrity of the political process could be called into question.
Yet, political involvement of economic interests has been an
integral element of our history and development as a nation. The
vital importance of governmental policies and decisions to the
well-being of virtually every business firm and labor organization
in our country ensures activism, no matter how expensive, on the
part of these groups. Accordingly, business, labor, and other spe-
cial interests have used the electoral process to influence the selec-
tion of public officials and bring before the public measures
designed to benefit their organizational trade.4" Since the turn of
the century, our nation has recognized the need for measures
designed to prevent corporate domination of the political pro-
cess.41 As Justice White noted in his dissent to Bellotti, govern-
ment regulation of corporate political spending has consistently
been upheld in order "to avoid the deleterious influences on fed-
eral elections resulting from the use of money by those who exer-
cise control over large aggregations of capital."'4 In a much
earlier case, Justice Frankfurter summarized the important policy
considerations involved in such regulation: "Speaking broadly,
what is involved here is the integrity of the electoral process and,
not less, the responsibility of the individual citizen for the success-
ful functioning of that process . . . . [These are] issues not less
than basic to a democratic society."43
A brief look at our nation's history confirms the circumstances
that have compelled our government to play an increasingly
39. See notes 69-85 infra and accompanying text.
40. For a brief discussion of the political history of corporate and union electoral ac-
tivity, see Epstein, Corporations and Labor Unions in Electoral Politics, 425 ANNALS 33
(1976).
41. For a discussion of the history of regulation of corporate political spending, see
United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570-84 (1957). See also notes 42-60 infra and accom-
panying text.
42. 435 U.S. at 812 (quoting United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 585 (1957)).
43. 352 U.S. at 570.
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greater role in the regulation of corporate political activity. The
post-Civil War era in America was marked by a national indus-
trial expansion and subsequent concentration of wealth which had
profound implications for social, economic, and political values
and mores.' Such economic concentration enhanced the popular
feeling that aggregated capital unduly influenced politics, and that
such influence too often manifested itself in the form of outright
corruption. 45 As two leading historians noted: "The nation was
fabulously rich but its wealth was gravitating rapidly into the
hands of a small portion of the population and the power of
wealth threatened to undermine the political integrity of the re-
public."46
Before the close of the nineteenth century many states had
passed laws requiring political candidates and their support com-
mittees to publicize the sources and amounts of campaign contri-
butions and expenditures.47 These laws were predicated on the
theory that publicity would discourage corporations from making
inappropriate political contributions and thus end their control
over party policies.48 In 1894 the Constitutional Convention of
New York was urged to prohibit political contributions by corpo-
rations. Elihu Root told the assembly:
The idea is to prevent the great railroad companies, the
great insurance companies, the great telephone companies, the
great aggregations of wealth from using their corporate funds,
directly or indirectly,. . . [for the] advancement of their inter-
ests as against those of the public. It strikes at a constantly
growing evil which has done more to shake the confidence of
the plain people of small means of this country than any other
practice which has ever obtained since the foundation of our
Government.49
It soon became clear that this was an issue of both local and
national concern. In his annual message of 1906, President Theo-
dore Roosevelt made legislation against corporate political contri-
butions a top priority.50 The Tillman Act,5" which prohibited
9
44. Id. at 570. Justice Frankfurter discussed the social and political history underly-
ing the Tillman Act, 2 U.S.C. § 4416 (1976). Id. at 570-74. For a description of the Till-
man Act, see text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
45. Id. at 570.
46. Id. (quoting 2 S. MORISON & H. COMMAGER, THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 355 (4th ed. 1950)).
47. Id. at 571.
48. See note 92 infra.
49. 352 U.S. at 571 (quoting E. ROOT, ADDRESSES ON GOVERNMENT AND CrizEN-
SHIP 143 (Bacon & Scott ed. 1916)).
50. Id. at 572.
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corporate contributions in connection with a federal election, was
the congressional response to this message. The history of this Act
shows that Congress intended it to uphold not only the integrity of
the electoral process, but also to revitalize responsible individual
participation in the democratic process.5 2
Congressional involvement in this area has continued and in-
tensified throughout the twentieth century. In 1910 Congress
again responded to public pressure by requiring political commit-
tees working in more than one state to report all contributions and
expenditures and to identify contributors and recipients of large
sums.5 3 In 1925 Congress enacted the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act which expanded the coverage of its predecessor by substitut-
ing "contribution" for "money contribution."54 In 1943 Congress
extended the prohibition against corporate campaign contribu-
tions to labor unions for the duration of World War II. This
restriction was made permanent by the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act of 1947.56 Further congressional concern produced the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974.5 In Buckley v. Valeo,59
the Supreme Court reinforced its endorsement of the underlying
congressional policies reflected in these statutes by sustaining the
individual contribution limits, the disclosure and reporting provi-
sions, and the public financing scheme.60 Obviously, this outline
of legislative activity is not a comprehensive analysis of congres-
sional activity in this area. It is cited merely as evidence of the
strong congressional interest in and concern with corporate politi-
cal activity.
51. Ch. 30, 34 Stat. 864 (1907) (current version at 2 U.S.C. § 4416 (1976)).
52. 352 U.S. at 575.
53. Id. For extensions of the Act, see id. at 576.
54. Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, ch. 368 tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070 (revised by
Federal Campaign Act of 1971 at 2 U.S.C. at § 431 (1976)).
55. Smith-Connally Act, ch. 144, § 9, 57 Stat. 163, 167.
56. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, § 304, 61
Stat. 159-60 (repealed 1976).
57. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
58. Pub. L. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974). For a more extensive examination of federal
legislation regulating corporate and labor campaign contributions and expenditures, see E.
EPSTEIN, CORPORATIONS, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: FEDERAL REGU-
LATION IN PERSPECTIVE 9-14 (1968).
59. 424 U.S. 1 (1975).
60. Id.
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III. CORPORATE INFLUENCE IN STATE AND LOCAL
REFERENDUMS
The area of law that will be most immediately affected by Bel-
lot/i is, of course, state regulation of corporate spending to influ-
ence the vote on referendums and initiatives. The Bellotti
decision has special Significance because in an increasing number
of states, it is becoming common practice for controversial and
very important public policy questions to be put to the voters in
the form of ballot questions.6
It is necessary to define the initiative and referendum proce-
dures and examine their historical origins in order to gain an un-
derstanding of the motivating factors behind them. The initiative
is a procedure which allows for a direct vote by the citizenry on
constitutional or statutory issues.62 In this procedure, proposed
constitutional amendments or legislation may be placed on the
ballot by petition. The proposal becomes law if it receives a ma-
jority vote.63 A referendum differs from the initiative in that the
referendum procedure affords voters the opportunity to repeal or
veto laws or amendments already passed by a legislative body. 4
While American democracy is characterized by a greater op-
portunity for direct individual participation in government than
most other democracies, the initiative and referendum processes
may be viewed as a step towards an even more direct democracy.
Members of the electorate, by resorting to such procedures, by-
pass the two party system. Historically, reformers have viewed
these devices as useful tools to circumvent insensitive or corrupt
political institutions and officials as well as a means to overcome
perceived improper influences generated by the aggregate eco-
nomic power of corporations or labor unions.65
61. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 5.
62. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 923 (4th ed. 1968).
63. Price, The Initiative: A Comparative State Analysis and Reassessment of a Western
Phenomenon, 28 W. POL. Q. 243, 244 (1975).
64. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 62, at 1446.
65. Price, supra note 63, at 243-44. The adoption of initiative and referendum proce-
dures was first advocated in the United States about one hundred years after the formation
of the federal government. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States
was swept by the Progressive reform movement. This movement made the most significant
impact on the agrarian, formerly populist sections of the midwestern, southern, and, espe-
ialy, the western portions of the United States. Id. The Progressives were concerned with
rampant corruption in the political system. Id. To secure a more honest and more popu-
larly responsive government, the Progressives advocated a wide range of political reforms
including the direct primary election, the secret ballot, recall, the referendum, and the initi-
ative. Id. The basic strategy of the Progressives was to check and control political institu-
[ ol. 29:808
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Today, as governmental control continues to pervade all as-
pects of our society, the government seemingly remains unrespon-
sive to a degree that disappoints those citizens who expect
democracy in practice to resemble democracy in theory. Many
Americans are seeking a means by which they can shape and in-
fluence public policy for the public good. Consequently, unprece-
dented numbers of citizens in every part of the nation are voting
on complex questions of state and local policy placed on the ballot
through the initiative and referendum procedures. Presently at
least twenty-three states and the District of Columbia provide for
initiative procedures, and an even greater number of states permit
the use of the referendum.66
There were at least 350 statewide proposals voted on in the
1978 elections.67 Forty of them were put on the ballot by citizen
petition. Only thirteen states had no statewide propositions on the
ballot although, in several of those states, there were local initia-
tives. 68
Although it is still too early to draw firm conclusions about the
role played by corporate political activity and the influence it may
have had in the 1978 ballot questions, an examination of the cam-
paigns and results of recent ballot questions indicates that, con-
trary to Justice Powell's statement in Bellot, there is some
evidence that heavy corporate involvement has had a significant
effect on the outcome of electoral decisions. In testimony
presented by Professor John Schockley before the Subcommittee
on the Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee6 9 and the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs of
the House Government Operations Committee,7" which was
tions by placing ultimate power in the hands of the people. The Progressives were aided by
like-minded reformers who believed that economic and political special interest groups
were unjustifiably dominating state governments. Like the Progressives, these reformers
advocated giving more political power to the electorate. Id.
66. Id. For provisions of initiatives and referendums by state, see THE COUNCIL OF
STATE GOVERrMENTS, THE BOOK OF STATEs, 244-45 (1978-1979).
67. Herbers, supra note 6.
68. No official information has been compiled yet. For a general discussion, see
Herbers, supra note 6, and Revere, Affairs of State, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 11, 1978, at
202.
69. The Subcommittee was conducting hearings on a national initiative constitutional
amendment. See generally S.J Res. 67, Joint Resolution Proposing an Amendment to theConstitution of the United States with Respect to the Proposal and Enactment of Laws by
Popular Vote of the People of the United States: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the
Constitution of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter
cited as 1977 Hearings].
70. This Subcommittee investigated the Internal Revenue Service's administration of
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based on a study of initiatives and referendums in Colorado and
eleven other states, a general pattern of the effect of heavy corpo-
rate participation was documented and discussed. There were
three aspects to this pattern. First, early opinion polls on meas-
ures which would adversely affect corporate interests showed that
voters favored these questions.7 Second, in no state did propo-
nents of these questions even remotely match the amount of funds
spent by opponents.72 Third, in seventy-five percent of the cases,
voters' attitudes shifted and the questions were defeated.73
There are two poignant examples of this pattern. In 1978, Cal-
ifornia voters were asked to vote on a referendum which, if
passed, would ban smoking in public places. Polls three months
before election day indicated that voters favored the referendum
by a fifty-eight percent to thirty-eight percent margin. 74 Oppo-
nents of the referendum (mainly tobacco companies) not only out-
spent referendum supporters tenfold,75 but outspent candidates
for elective office by a similar proportion as well.76 California vot-
ers defeated the referendum 54.4 percent to 45.6 percent.77
Another example given by Professor Schockley was a 1976
Colorado initiative which would have eliminated a state sales tax
on food and would have replaced lost state revenues by imposing
a tax on mining activity and an increased tax on corporations.78
Early polls showed that voters overwhelmingly favored the estab-
lishment of the populist-like tax on big business and the abolish-
ment of the unpopular sales tax.79 Opponents of the initiative
(financed mainly by large business and mining concerns) spent
over sixteen times more money on the campaign than did the initi-
ative's supporters.8" The initiative was subsequently defeated. 81
the tax laws relating to corporate lobbying. See generaly IRSAdministration of Tax Laws
Relating to Lobbying (Part I): Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumers,
and Monetary Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as 1978 Hearings].
71. Id. at 239 (statement of Professor John Schockley).
72. Id.
73. Nine of twelve questions were defeated. Id.
74. Washington Post, Nov. 5, 1978, at Azo, col. 1.
75. Opponents of the measure reported contributions of $5,648,462 of which the major
tobacco companies contributed 97 percent. Id. Supporters reported receiving $585,791 in
contributions. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 1977 Hearings, supra note 69, at 181 (statement of Professor John Schockley).
79. Id. at 182. One local poll showed voters favoring the initiative 55 percent to 27
percent. Id. at 179.
80. Id. at 178.
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From his study, Professor Schockley concluded that "[tihe lim-
ited data we have now clearly supports the view that properly di-
rected money is powerful in influencing citizens' attitudes towards
initiatives, and in these cases the money came from corporate
grass-roots lobbying." 82 Conceivably, an argument that Professor
Schockley's study conclusively nullifies the concern of the Bellotti
majority that there was no record to show significant corporate
influence through campaign spending, and that, as such, Belloti
should be overruled could be easily rebutted. An accurate mea-
surement of the actual effect of corporate involvement on voters is
very likely impossible to obtain, and Schockley's study results
could be due to a wide range of variables unrelated to the effect of
corporate electioneering. Thus, one may validly argue that corpo-
rate participation in initiative and referendum campaigns should
not be prohibited (through allowing statutes like the one from
Massachusetts in Bellotl to stand) because of such speculative evi-
dence on the effect of such activity. This argument is even more
potent when one realizes the countervailing interests militating
against such prohibition---the rights protected by the first amend-
ment.
Yet, the pattern presented by the Schockley study should be
considered somewhat probative on the issue of corporate influence
on voter opinion. Disparate financing certainly produced differ-
ent types of campaigns and differences in media access. Addition-
ally, the special nature of initiative and referendum campaigns
should be considered. As Professor Schockley noted:
Because personality issues may be less important, and partisan-
ship is less clear, money may be all the more crucial. While
voters may judge the issues on their merits, they also have
fewer defenses or orienting devices to use when massive adver-
tising engulfs them. Especially when no basic philosophical
themes or traditional ideological criteria are employed, it is all
the harder for voters to be able to withstand powerful media
assaults. The result thus can become what happened in Colo-
rado in 1976: those already most powerful, those with the most
money, won.83
Two important consequences follow from the probative nature
of the Schockley study. First, contrary to the argument outlined
81. Id. at 181-85. Polls showed that voters who had previously approved of the initia-
tive 55 percent to 22 percent, see note 79 supra, defeated the initiative by a margin of 61
percent to 39 percent. 1977 Hearings. supra note 69, at 179.
82. 1978 Hearings, supra note 70, at 258.
83. 1977 Hearings, supra note 70, at 189.
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above, while the Schockley study is not conclusive as to the effect
of corporate campaign activity, it (and studies like it) may be
enough for a court to find a satisfactory record on this question
and thus uphold statutes like the one in Bellotti.
A second consequence of the study is that such probative evi-
dence of corporate influence may serve as the basis of some legis-
lative activity which would not prohibit corporate participation
outright but would restrict or minimize the effect of such partici-
pation. Such a pattern may have a pronounced effect on the atti-
tude of the public with regard to its role in the election process.
The feeling that those with the most money will win may erode
citizen confidence in the political system. Indeed, the apparent
influence of corporations over initiatives and referendums repre-
sents a particular irony since those decisionmaking procedures are
popularly perceived as perhaps the most effective tools for direct,
democratic participation by the citizenry to influence public policy
and to "make a difference."84 Thus, the pattern presented may
doubly erode public confidence in the democratic process-a
problem which, as noted above,85 has been a key factor in the de-
velopment of statutory restrictions on corporate campaign activity
in the past.
IV. THE IMPACT OF BELLOyTI ON CORPORATE REFERENDUM
AND INITIATIVE SPENDING: LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
It appears that the Belloii decision will make it very difficult
for states to prohibit corporate expenditures or contributions in
connection with referendums or initiatives that involve issues
which have no material connection with corporate business. 86 As
Justice White noted in his dissent, "the Court not only invalidated
a statute which had been on the books in one form or another for
many years, but also casts considerable doubt upon the constitu-
tionality of legislation passed by some 31 States restricting corpo-
rate political activity ....
84. See, e.g., id. at 177. See also note 65 supra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 39-60 supra and accompanying text.
86. Fox, supra note 21, at 85.
87. 435 U.S. at 803. Eighteen states prohibit or limit corporate contributions with
respect to ballot questions. Id. at 803 n.l. In addition, Bellotti may have an effect on
congressional efforts to adopt a national initiative procedure. One resolution, introduced
by Senators Abourezk and Hatfield in 1977 would give citizens the power to place pro-
posed laws on a national ballot. SJ. Res. 67, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. reprintedin 1977 Hear-
ings, supra note 69, at 9. Similar measures were introduced in the House of
Representatives. H.J. Res. 544, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings,
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Absent some future Supreme Court decision which narrows
the Bellotti decision on the basis of a more adequate record sup-
porting the need for regulation of corporate referendum spending,
there are several avenues open to the legislative branch. As indi-
cated above, it is not clear whether restrictions on corporate cam-
paign activity, as opposed to an outright ban, would withstand
constitutional scrutiny.8" One type of restriction might impose
dollar limits upon expenditures or contributions for corporations.
However, as one commentator has explained,8 9 if Bellotti can be
viewed as prohibiting unreasonable burdens on corporate speech
on political or economic matters,9° then such limitations may very
well be struck down as unconstitutional since the difference be-
tween what limits would be reasonable or unreasonable to a par-
ticular court cannot be easily defined.
A. Disclosure
There are other alternatives, such as more useful disclosure re-
quirements which could better withstand constitutional scrutiny
while serving an important state interest. It may be argued that
since corporations may now spend freely to influence voter behav-
ior on noncandidate ballot issues, it is more important than ever
that there be meaningful disclosure requirements regarding those
expenditures. Disclosure may be one of the few effective means to
guarantee full public awareness of such corporate political activ-
ity. Federal legislation might be enacted to deal with this prob-
lem, but because the use of the initiative and referendum
processes has been confined to the state and local level, it is diffi-
cult to define what role, if any, the federal government should
play in the promulgation of disclosure requirements.
The governmental interests sought to be vindicated by disclo-
supra note 69, at 24, introduced by Rep. Vander Jagt and H.J. Res. 658, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, supra note 69, at 30, introduced by Rep. Jones.
This proposal would permit popular decisions to be made on legislation at biennial con-
gressional elections. To get an initiated bill on the ballot would require petition signatures
equal to three percent of the total votes cast in the last Presidential election and would have
to equal over three percent of such a vote in at least ten states. S.J. Res. 67, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 Hearings, supra note 69, at 9. Although not expressly
adopted in the Abourezk-Hatfield resolution, any restrictions or procedures on corporate
activity in national ballot questions may run counter to Bellotti and would possibly allow
the perceived undue influence of corporate campaign activity to be magnified to the na-
tional level.
88. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
89. Fox, Corporate Political Speech, supra note 21, at 88. See also note 38 supra.
90. Id. at 101. See also note 91 infra.
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sure requirements, however, are clear, and were perhaps best
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo.91
First, disclosure provides the electorate with information "as to
where political campaign money comes from and how it is be-
ing spent by the candidate" in order to aid the voters in evalu-
ating those who seek federal office.... Second, disclosure
requirements deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance
of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures
to the light of publicity. This exposure may discourage those
who would use money for improper purposes . .. Third, and
not least significant, record keeping, reporting, and disclosure
requirements are an essential means of gathering the data nec-
essarY92to detect violations of the contribution limitations
Legislation such as a bill introduced, but not acted on, in the
95th Congress would take a modest first step towards imposing
some disclosure requirements on a wide variety of corporate polit-
ical activities.93 The bill would have required every licensee of the
Federal Communications Commission to keep, and permit public
inspection of, requests for broadcast time made on behalf of, or in
relation to, any proposition, referendum, or ballot question in any
state or local election." The bill specified that the public record
must include information showing the origin of the request, the
disposition made by the licensee and, if the request is granted, the
amount charged for the broadcast or broadcasts and the number
and time of day of such broadcasts.95 Federal Communications
Commission regulations already require every licensee to keep
and permit public inspection of advertising contracts relating to
electoral candidates.96 Extension of this rule to noncandidate bal-
lot questions is merely the sound and logical next step in efforts to
ensure a fair and open political process.
Since radio and television play an important role in state and
91. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Buckley Court upheld new Federal campaign financing
disclosure. In analyzing the constitutionality of federal limitations on the amounts that
could be spent for contributions and expenditures, the Court distinguished between dollar
restrictions and disclosure requirements, concluding that the former directly affected the
quantity and quality of the payer's speech, and thus, were unconstitutional.
92. Id. at 66-68. Cf BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS
USE IT 62 (ed. 1967) where Mr. Justice Brandeis made the case for disclosure: "Publicity is
justly commended as a remedy for social and institutional diseases. Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman."
93. S. 3457, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). It is expected that this legislation will be
reintroduced in the 96th Congress.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. 47 C.F.R. § 73, 1940(d) (1978).
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local ballot question advertising, the disclosure requirements
mandated by this bill would play an important role in guarantee-
ing to all interested parties the information necessary to examine
and respond to the serious imbalance that often exists in access to
the media between citizen groups and well-financed industry and
corporate interests. The information yielded by these disclosure
requirements will enable both the legislative and judicial branches
to consider more carefully the impact of disproportionate spend-
ing on state and local referendums. Such disclosure may in the
future provide the Supreme Court with the information necessary
to effectuate the Bellotti caveat and determine whether the relative
voice of corporations has been overwhelming in influencing refer-
endums and initiatives.
B. Enforcement of Tax Statutes
The unlimited corporate spending to influence voter behavior
on noncandidate ballot questions allowed by Bellotti makes more
important than ever government enforcement of not only disclo-
sure, but accounting and tax laws which relate to these expendi-
tures, as well. As state and local referendums have increased in
number, corporate political lobbying has mushroomed in scope.97
More money is being spent as a wider range of activities is being
adopted.98 Strict enforcement of tax and accounting laws may
help ensure that an already enormous information gap caused by
disparate financial resources99 does not become wider through the
illegal financing of advertising on the corporate side.
Section 162(e) of the Internal Revenue Code provides a tax
deduction for certain types of "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses incurred in attempting to influence legislation.10 While
direct lobbying expenses, such as those incurred in appearing
before, submitting statements to, or sending communications to
any legislative body or its members, are deductible,' 0' indirect
lobbying (also called "grassroots lobbying") expenses are nonde-
ductible." 2 These nondeductible expenditures are statutorily de-
fined as any amount paid or incurred "for participation in, or
intervention in, any political campaign on behalf of any candidate
97. See 1978 Hearings, supra note 70, at 15-17 (statement of Harvey Schulman).
98. Id.
99. Id.; see also notes 69-85 supra and accompanying text.
100. L.LC. § 162(e).
101. Id. § 162(e)(1).
102. Id. § 162(e)(2).
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for public office,"' 3 or "in connection with any attempt to influ-
ence the general public, or segments thereof, with respect to legis-
lative matters, elections or referendums.""
The Internal Revenue Service has adopted regulations which
lend more certainty to the statutory prohibition of deductions for
attempts to influence elections, legislative matters, or referen-
dums.' Furthermore, the IRS has provided that taxpayers can-
not achieve by circumvention that which they were not entitled to
directly. Thus, if a taxpayer paid dues or made contributions to
an organization such as a trade association which devotes a sub-
stantial part of its activities to indirect lobbying, only that portion
of the dues or contributions which do not relate to indirect lobby-
ing may be properly deducted as a business expense.
A number of factors explain the compelling governmental in-
terest in the nondeductibility of grassroots lobbying expenses.
Harvey Schulman, Executive Director of Media Access Project, 06
outlined these factors in testimony before the Commerce, Con-
sumer, and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the House Govern-
ment Operations Committee. 10 7 First, there is the presumption
that it is best for the government to maintain a "hands-off" policy
where political campaigns are concerned; no taxpayer-whether a
corporation, trust, or individual-should expect to receive any
governmental assistance in its political efforts through the use of
income tax deductions. 10 8
Second, to the extent the government exercises this "hands-
off" policy, consumers have a greater opportunity to express their
approval or disapproval with the political activities of a corpora-
tion by exercising buyer influence in the marketplace. 9 If the
costs of grassroots activity could be deducted from income, it
might be argued that the public would, in effect, be subsidizing the
views of the taxpayer." 10
Third, to the extent that the government will or should become
involved in political campaigns, its involvement should attempt to
103. Id. § 162(e)(2)(A).
104. Id. § 162(e)(2)(B).
105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-20 (1979).
106. Media Access Project is a public interest law firm in Washington, D.C., which
specializes in communications law and first amendment issues, including the financing of
advertising. 1978 Hearings, supra note 69, at 55-59 (statement of Harvey Schulman).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 55.
109. Id. at 56.
110. Id. at 55-58.
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decrease the imbalance in access to public forums."' As Mr.
Schulman testified:
Especially in the multimedia twentieth century, a speaker's
ability to influence political affairs is determined not only by
the rightness of what he or she says and by the persuasiveness
with which it is said, but also by the media campaign that the
speaker is able and willing to afford." 2
In general, businesses are willing and able to spend far more on
political campaigns than most individuals could ever match." 3
According to Mr. Schulman, it is precisely because Congress rec-
ognized this tremendous inequality between corporate taxpayers
and others that it refused to exercise its legislative grace with re-
spect to certain types of lobbying expenses."
4
In addition to congressional approval, the United States
Supreme Court has upheld the nondeductibility of indirect lobby-
ing expenses against attacks on first amendment grounds:
Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they
engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply
being required to pay for those activities entirely out of their
own pockets, as everyone else engaging in similar activities is
required to do under the provisions of the Internal Revenue
Code ... . [S]ince purchased publicity can influence the fate
of legislation which will affect, directly or indirectly, all in the
community, everyone in the community should stand on the
same footing as regards its purchases so far as the Treasury of
the United States is concerned. 15
In light of the important policies behind section 162(e)(2), its
strict enforcement might be expected. However, there is some in-
dication that the IRS has been lax in its enforcement of this
law." 6 While the IRS presently utilizes regular auditing proce-
dures in an attempt to ensure compliance with the tax laws," 7 fur-
ther steps could be taken to ensure a better understanding of, and
111. Id. at 58.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 59.
114. Id. at 59.
115. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
116. Harvey Schulman told the House Government Subcommittee:
My analysis of the documents obtained by this Subcommittee leads me to the
conclusion that there are wholesale violations of the Internal Revenue laws; that
the IRS has been grossly negligent in enforcing the laws against the violators; that
reform measures must be adopted if there is to be any hope of policing of those
who engage in "indirect" or "grassroots" lobbying.
1978 Hearings, supra note 70, at 51-52 (statement of Harvey Schulman).
117. See id. at 164-65 (letter from Donald C. Alexander, Commissioner of Internal
Revenue).
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voluntary compliance with, these tax laws by corporations claim-
ing ordinary and necessary business expense deductions.
Harvey Schulman has suggested several possibilities. Adop-
tion of better guidelines defining section 162(e)(2) advertising and
distinguishing it from deductible institutional or goodwill adver-
tising would be an important first step.'" 8 Towards this end, a
very simple and helpful reform would be to amend Schedule M of
the corporate tax return to provide a specific line for section
162(e)(2) expenses.
With this change, not only would the IRS be better able to
monitor taxpayer performance, but corporations themselves could
be expected to keep a separate account on their books for such
activities." 9 Labeling of advertisements and their submission to
the IRS would be another effective reform towards gaining better
IRS enforcement in this area. Presently, even assuming that every
ad could be gathered from various sources, there is no way to
know of the tax treatment of each advertisement without an audit.
The undesirability of spending already limited agency resources
on such audits is a serious deterrent to enforcement of the law.12 0
Mr. Schulman has suggested that these problems could be
solved, however, by requiring advertisers to label each *advertise-
ment as "IRS deductible" to indicate that it is considered
nonpolitical. 2 ' Labeling requirements are not new, as evidenced
by FTC and congressional treatment of cigarette advertising.' 22
Moreover, with its tax return, each advertiser could be required to
submit a compendium of all advertising sponsored by it during
the year in question, including a list of all costs associated with the
dissemination of each advertisement. 123
Schulman has also proposed that citizens should be permitted
to challenge treatment of political advertising. 2 4 The Federal
Power Act and Federal Power Commission regulations permit cit-
izen complaints which must be answered by utilities and provide
for the availability of appellate review.1 25 In sharp contrast, how-
ever, the Internal Revenue Code and IRS regulations do not pro-
vide for similar procedures. The IRS should adopt an
118. Id. at 151-53.
119. Id. at 151.
120. Id. at 154.
121. Id.
122. Cigarette Labeling and Advertising 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-40 (1976).
123. 1978 Hearings, supra note 70, at 154.
124. Id. at 156-58.
125. Id. at 156.
[Vol 29:808
CORPORATE SPENDING
administrative scheme to provide for more meaningful citizen en-
forcement of the congressional policy against corporate deduc-
tions for political advertising. If the IRS claims it does not possess
the power to set up that scheme, congressional action may be mer-
ited.126
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti has made it possible
for corporate and industrial groups to become even more involved
in attempts to influence the vote in state and local referendums.
The decision is troubling because corporations are, after all, quite
different from human beings. As the Washington Post noted in an
editorial following the Supreme Court's decision, corporations are
not minds that formulate ideas, or even voices that freely express
them. Rather, in a political debate, corporations serve as mega-
phones for the views of those who own or control them. 127 And,
as Justice White pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Bellotti:
Corporations are artificial entities created by law for the pur-
pose of furthering certain economic goals .... [Tihe special
status of corporations has placed them in a position to control
vast amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated,
dominate not only the economy but also the very heart of our
democracy, the electoral process.12 8
The Court in Bellotti noted that "[ijf appellee's arguments
were supported by record or legislative findings that corporate ad-
vocacy threatened imminently to undermine democratic
processes, thereby denigrating rather than serving first amend-
ment interests, these arguments would merit our considera-
tion."'129  Such a record is now being built, at least in
congressional hearings at the national level. If it appears that cor-
porations are indeed exerting undue influence in initiative and
referendum campaigning, this may, in turn, prompt legislative ac-
tion to mitigate such effects. With such enactments and with the
ever-increasing use of referendums and initiatives at the state and
local level, it may not be very long before the Supreme Court has
an opportunity to reassess the appropriate role which corporations
should play in the electoral process.
126. Id. at 158.
127. Washington Post, May 2, 1970, at A-18, col. 1.
128. 435 U.S. at 809.
129. Id. at 789.
